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Conceptual modeling is fundamental to information systems requirements engineering. Systems analysts and 
designers use the constructs and methods of a conceptual modeling formalism to represent, communicate, and 
validate the contents, capabilities, and constraints of an envisioned information system within its organizational 
context. The value of such a representation is measured by the degree to which it facilitates a shared understanding 
among all stakeholders of (1) the organizational information requirements and (2) the ability of the envisioned 
information system to meet them [Wand and Weber, 2002]. We propose using the social ontology developed by 
John Searle [1995, 2006, 2010] as the basis for conceptual modeling and present a meta-model based on that 
ontology. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The philosophical discipline of ontology provides a substantive basis for creating a shared understanding among the 
stakeholders in a system design undertaking [Gruninger and Lee, 2002]. A number of researchers have proposed 
using ontology as the basis upon which to develop and evaluate conceptual modeling grammars (constructs and 
rules) and methods [Wand and Weber, 1995, 2002; Gemino and Wand, 2005; Burton-Jones and Meso, 2006]. In 
general, ontology seeks a definitive and exhaustive classification of being (or existence) in a given domain. In this 
work, we investigate using the social ontology proposed by John Searle [1995, 2006, 2010] as a philosophical 
foundation for conceptual modeling (see Figure 1). 
Conceptual modeling is concerned with representing the requirements of organizational information systems. 
Organizational information systems are concerned with documenting, monitoring, analyzing, and participating in 
business activities that affect the performance of an organization. They are concerned primarily, although not 
exclusively, with “institutional reality,” [Searle, 1995, 2010] a “reality” that is created and maintained by human 
declarations (collective intentionality) for human purposes
1
. In contrast, a “scientific ontology” such as that proposed 
by Bunge [1977] is concerned exclusively with “objects that exist in space and time.” It is devoid of human intentions 
and ideas that give meaning to social phenomena. As Searle [2010] explains, “the whole point of institutional reality 
is … to create and regulate power relationships between people. Human social reality … is about people’s activities 
and about the power relations that not only govern but constitute those activities” (p. 106). Information systems are 
tools used to document and participate in those activities [March and Allen, 2007].  
Searle [2010] makes three claims in his social ontology: 
First, all of human institutional reality, and in that sense nearly all of human civilization, is created 
in its initial existence and maintained in its continued existence by a single logico-linguistic 
operation. Second, we can state exactly what that operation is. It is a Status Function Declaration 
[X counts as Y in context C]. And third, the enormous diversity and complexity of human 
civilization is explained by the fact that the operation is not restricted in subject matter and can be 
applied over and over in a recursive fashion, is often applied to the outcomes of earlier 
applications and with various interlocking subject matters, to create all of the complex structure of 
actual human societies. (p. 201) 
Status functions represent bundles of deontic powers. That is, they carry rights, duties, obligations, requirements, 
permissions, authorizations, entitlements, and so on.  Such bundles of deontic powers are often recognized as 
conceptual objects or roles within an organization or within society in general.  The fundamental concept is that, in a 
social context, people, as agents of an institution, have the capacity to impose “status functions” on objects and 
people that enable those objects and people to perform functions that they cannot perform “solely in virtue of their 
physical structure” [Searle, 2010, p. 7]. That is, the performance of such functions require that there be a collectively 
recognized status that the person or object has, and it is only by virtue of that status that the person or object can 
perform the function in question.  
For example, a physical object that is given the status function private property is recognized by people in society as 
such and is legally protected from being appropriated by another person. Such appropriation is termed theft and is 
punishable by law. No object could impose such sanctions on a person by virtue of its physical structure. It is solely 
by collective intentionality that private property “exists.” The physical object exists independent of human 
intentionality or even of human knowledge of its existence [Bunge, 1977]. However, its status as private property 
requires human intentionality and the imposition of a status function recognized within the social context. In Bunge’s 
terminology, private property is a “fiction” that exists solely in human minds. Similarly, the president of the United 
States, a twenty-dollar bill, and a professor in a university are all people or objects that are able to perform certain 
functions by virtue of the fact that they have a collectively recognized status that enables them to perform such 
                                                     
1
 We note that the Internet of Things (IoT) deals primarily with the tracking of physical objects; however, it is the interpretation of the meaning of 
their properties that gives the IoT its power. It is, effectively, where Searle meets Bunge. 
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functions as declaring war, exchanging for goods and services, and voting on a tenure case, respectively [Searle, 
2010]. 
 
Figure 1. A Meta-Model Based on Searle’s Ontology 
 
Consequently, Searle distinguishes two types of facts: brute facts and institutional facts. Brute facts are ontologically 
objective. They are scientifically verifiable and exist independently of human intentions, purposes, or objectives. For 
example, concrete objects, such as planets and people with substantial properties such as mass and volume, are 
brute facts [Bunge, 1977].  Institutional facts are ontologically subjective but epistemologically objective. They have 
no “substance” but exist by shared human belief and agreement (collective intentionality) within social contexts 
(institutions). Again, in Bunge’s terminology they are “fictions” of the human mind [Bunge, 1977] created by people 
for human purposes. Searle does not propose the existence of two separate realities, brute and institutional, but 
rather recognizes that people declare (speak into existence) “fictitious entities,” such as money and corporations, 
and ascribe status functions, such as ownership, to concrete objects for their own purposes. These entities and 
functions are “fictitious” in the sense that they are not concrete objects or substantial properties, but they exist in the 
collective minds of people within the context of interest (social institution). They are, however, the basis for all social 
interaction, and it is their epistemological objectivity that is the basis for social interaction. It is this social interaction 
that forms the requirements for organizational information systems: ownership (and transfer of ownership), 
payments, employment, contracts, authorizations, responsibilities, and so on.  
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Smith [in Smith and Searle, 2003] points out that, consistent with Bunge’s notion of nominal invariance [Bunge, 
1977], brute facts frequently involve post hoc naming conventions. In contrast, naming is constitutive of institutional 
facts: For example, the existence of the planet named Earth is a brute fact, the existence of the state of Utah is an 
institutional fact. Earth is a naming convention for a physical object (of the type “planet,” again a naming convention). 
However, because Utah was declared to be a “state” in the United States (i.e., “named” as such), it was given the 
status functions (rights and obligations, etc.) ascribed to states by the United States Constitution. That is, as all other 
states in the United States, it has a physical location (that we agree to be its state boundaries), but it also has 
deontic powers (rights, obligations, etc.) ascribed to it that are completely independent of its physical properties. For 
example, as a “state,” Utah has the right to levy taxes and to issue driver’s licenses to its residents. It has the 
obligation of complying with and enforcing the laws of the United States. 
Somewhat amazingly, institutional facts are created and maintained by speech acts (declarations) that declare the 
fact to exist. For example, Utah became a state in the United States on January 4, 1896, by a declaration of the 
United States government. That declaration is a speech act empowered by the laws of the United States (a set of 
constitutive rules themselves declared into existence by speech acts) that impose statehood. That declaration was 
recognized and accepted by the people of Utah and of the United States, and, indeed of the relevant world (context). 
Without recognition and acceptance, the declaration would be powerless. Consider, for example, the United States 
Declaration of Independence, the speech act “spoken” on July 2, 1776, that declared the United States to be a 
“country.” England did not recognize or accept that declaration until September 3, 1783, when it “spoke” the Treaty 
of Paris. Searle notes that recognition and acceptance of institutional facts must often be backed up by force or at 
least the threat of force, and that it is only by virtue of the acceptance of institutional facts resulting in a shared 
(objective) epistemology that society “works.”  
The importance of a shared epistemology—that is, epistemological objectivity—cannot be overemphasized. It is only 
because of shared beliefs, for example, that a particular piece of paper with certain markings on it “counts as” 
money and can be used for exchange. If, in fact, a sufficient number of people lose confidence in the institution that 
has declared such pieces of paper to be money, they will cease to be so and commerce facilitated by them will 
cease. A less dramatic but no less amazing event occurred in the late 1990s when the European Union converted to 
the euro and set dates on which existing country currencies would lose their face value. Clearly, on the specified 
dates, there were no ontological changes to the pieces of paper representing those currencies. Yet epistemologically 
they changed dramatically. They no longer “counted as” money and could not be used for commerce. As discussed 
in the following paragraphs, this demonstrates that the meta-objects “above the line” in Figure 1, are 
epistemologically objective (having deontic power in social interaction) even though they are ontologically subjective 
(having no physical substance). 
Searle introduces the notion of constitutive rules of the form “X counts as Y in context C” as “standing Declarations” 
that bring institutional facts into existence. Such a rule indicates that an object X has the status Y in an institutional 
context C. Status functions attach deontic powers (rights, obligations, etc.) to the status Y. And status functions work 
in society only to the extent they are recognized and accepted. “Rules of games and constitutions of nations are 
typical examples where the constitutive rules function as standing Declarations. So, for example, the Constitution of 
the United States makes it the case by Declaration that any presidential candidate who receives the majority of 
votes in the Electoral College counts as the president-elect” [Searle, 2010, p. 13]. Similarly, the commercial code 
and organizational policies function as sets of standing declarations that govern the deontic powers of contracts, 
agreements, and so on among business organizations. 
It is by use of language that people have the capacity to create institutional (social) reality by representing that reality 
as existing. Searle [2010] contends, “We create private property, money, government, marriage, and a thousand 
other phenomena by representing them as existing” (p. 86). Provided the representation is recognized and accepted 
in the desired context, the institutional reality becomes “epistemologically objective” and is taken as fact. For 
example, when a person is hired by an organization, that person (X) “counts as” an employee (Y) in the context of 
the regulatory system in which the organization functions (C). An employee (status) has specific deontic powers 
(rights, obligations, etc.) some of which are defined by the social institution (governmental regulations) and some of 
which are defined by the organization (corporate work, salary and benefit policies). Furthermore, constitutive rules 
are recursive: an employee (X) “counts as” a salesperson (Y) in an organization by a declarative act. A salesperson 
accrues additional deontic powers in that they have the right to offer company products for sale to customers. At 
least one role of an information system is the same as that of written language: to document the existence of status 
functions assigned to specific objects.  
A special case of standing declarations is when there is no explicit (concrete) object X (brute fact) that “stands for” a 
set of deontic powers, but a “fictitious entity” is created having those deontic powers. Examples include electronic 
money and corporations. Using the laws of the state of California for the creation of corporations, Searle [2010] 
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contends, “We can create … corporations by saying something equivalent to ‘Let there be a corporation!’” (p. 101) 
and concludes, “In this case we seem to have created a remarkably potent object, a limited liability corporation, so to 
speak out of thin air” (p. 98). However, and crucially important for conceptual modeling, Searle [2010] further argues 
“it should be impossible for anything in the real world not to be grounded in the basic facts. … Money, corporations 
… cannot just float on thin air” (p. 180). Thus, the deontic powers associated with status functions in such cases 
“always bottom out in actual human beings who have the powers in question because they are represented as 
having them (p. 108).” That is, it is not necessary to have any physical realization of institutional objects such as 
money or corporations; however, it is necessary to have people who are owners of money and representatives of 
corporations to whom the deontic powers in question accrue. 
Searle [2010] concludes, “…ontologically speaking, to create a minimal institutional reality you need exactly three 
things: (1) human beings, (2) intentionality, including collective intentionality including the capacity to impose 
functions on objects and people, and (3) language capable of Declarational speech acts” (p. 109). Institutional facts 
are created using language (declarations) and extra-linguistic conventions (e.g., policies and regulations). These 
extra-linguistic conventions are themselves created by language. The utterance of the appropriate language 
(declaration) in appropriate circumstances, possibly with accompanying actions, results in the creation of the 
institutional fact. The speaker (agent who creates the institutional facts) typically requires a special position or 
special condition, also created by language. For example, a tenured faculty member raising his or her hand at a 
faculty meeting “counts as” a vote in favor of granting tenure. The collective set of votes “counts as” a 
recommendation of the faculty to grant or deny tenure. Such a recommendation (institutional fact) can hold 
significant consequences for the faculty member in question. 
One of the consequences of the existence of “fictitious entities” (such as corporations) for conceptual modeling in 
information systems is that, in general, we cannot conceptualize classes as collections of preexisting institutional 
objects. In Searle’s words [2010]:  
Notice that for some of the cases we have discussed, such as creating a corporation, we cannot 
have a universally quantified rule that ranges over a domain of preexisting objects. And more 
interestingly, we cannot even have an existentially quantified form to the effect that there is some x 
such that x is [an institutional object such as] a corporation, because by hypothesis there is no 
preexisting x which becomes the corporation (pp. 119-120). 
The implication is that we must first conceptualize the class as a set of deontic powers and declare the class to exist 
before it can be populated with instances. Similar arguments can be made for cases where status functions are 
imposed on concrete objects. For example, we cannot look for objects that are employees of an organization until 
the collection of deontic powers that constitute the class “employee” has been created (e.g., obligation to work, right 
to be paid). The “role” of employee is imposed on collections of people post hoc by declaration; that is, by an 
intentional speech act performed by an authorized agent, within the context of the business organization. Similarly, 
we cannot look for objects that are products of an organization until the collection of deontic powers that constitute 
the class “product” has been created (right to be offered for sale at a price, obligation to be delivered when ordered, 
obligation to warrantee serviceability). The “role” of product is imposed on objects by declaration (e.g., product 
catalog listing, product descriptions, and price). That imposition is part of the organizational communication process 
that is foundational to organizational information systems [Kent, 1978]. 
II. USING SOCIAL ONTOLOGY TO GUIDE CONCEPTUAL MODELING 
The promise of ontology as a foundation for conceptual modeling has been that ontology can help us better model a 
domain [Weber, 2012; Wand and Weber, 2002; Wand, Storey and Weber, 1999; Gruber, 1995] and thereby result in 
better information system designs [Simon, 1996; Hevner, March, Park and Ram, 2004]. Although examining 
ontology has given us some guidance in this area—for example, when to use optional attributes in diagrams [Bodart, 
Patel, Sim, and Weber, 2001], how to model part-whole relationships [Shanks, Tansley, Nuredini, Tobin, and Weber, 
2008]—general guidelines about how to conceptualize a domain remain elusive.  We believe that for institutional 
reality, the structure of Searle’s ontology provides such a guide for modeling a given domain [March and Allen, 
2007].  
As discussed above, the basic formula for Searle’s social ontology is stated as:  X counts as Y in context C.  At the 
lowest level of social construction, Xs are brute facts. They are ontologically objective and entirely subject to 
scrutiny. Ys are social constructions that impose upon X a collection of deontic powers (obligations, rights, 
privileges, authorizations, etc.). Deontic powers are institutional facts.  That is, they exist because they are 
recognized and accepted by common agreement.  C is the context that bounds the semantics and deontic power of 
the Ys.   
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Consider again the brute fact of a person raising his or her hand.  Normally, this act does not create any institutional 
fact; it is ascribed no deontic power.  If, however, the person doing the hand raising is a member of a corporate 
board and is sitting in a board meeting, and the person conducting the meeting has just said, “Those in favor of 
approving the motion raise your hand,” then the X (raising the hand) counts as Y (a vote in favor of the motion) in 
context C (the board meeting).  In this case, the person leading the meeting has an objective: to determine whether 
the motion should be approved or not. Applying Searle’s formula recursively, the set of votes (the Xs are now 
institutional facts rather than brute facts) counts as the voting result (Y).  A voting result has deontic powers: 
determining whether the motion is approved or not. A voting result (X) that satisfies the constitutive rule “receives a 
majority of votes” counts as an approval (Y), which imposes deontic powers—it obligates the organization to the 
terms of the motion, such as approving or disapproving a budget or an acquisition, the use of a particular audit firm, 
changes to accounting methods, and so on. Of course, before a vote can be taken, the bundle of deontic powers 
designated a “motion” must be defined, and the constitutive rules for creating a motion must be recognized and 
accepted within the organization (institution). Frequently Robert’s Rules of Order are used as the set of constitutive 
rules for the speech acts necessary for the creation of motions, votes, and approvals.  
Furthermore, deontic powers create reasons for action (e.g., obligations) and expectations for actions from others 
(e.g., rights). The person (X) who is the chair of the meeting (Y) is obligated to initiate voting when certain conditions 
are met (e.g., a member of the board has “called the question”). Each person (X) who is a board member (Y) has the 
right to cast a vote. The reason for taking the action “raise your right hand” is to engage the right to vote in favor of 
or in opposition to the motion.  Understanding how these deontic powers are created and fulfilled is at the heart of 
understanding a domain for conceptual modeling.   
We propose analyzing how deontic powers are created and fulfilled as the foundation of using Searle’s ontology to 
guide conceptual modeling. Analyzing a domain is then a matter of the recursive application of the formula “X counts 
as Y in context C” with a particular interest in the institutions and constitutive rules they define; the purposes of the 
system; the objectives to be accomplished; the bundles of deontic powers required to accomplish them; and the 
objects, agents, actions and events (speech acts) upon which those deontic powers accrue.  Referring to Figure 1, 
we propose the following process: 
1. Identify the Institutions that form the context of the system under analysis. Institutions exist by virtue of 
collective intentionality to fulfill a purpose. For example, business systems exist within governmental 
institutions, such as national and state governments,  and regulatory agencies, such as the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (or PCAOB) and the 
business organization itself. For states that have adopted it as law, the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 
specifies constitutive rules and deontic powers associated with commercial transactions (institutional 
objects) such as sales, leases, negotiable instruments, bills of lading, letters of credit, and so on. It also 
establishes conditions on the constitutive rules that create commercial transactions such as signatures and 
authorizations. Business organizations typically establish corresponding constitutive rules and additional 
conditions that define how such objects are created and managed within the organization. Conceptually, 
“business rules” are constitutive and represent bundles of deontic powers. One advantage of basing an 
analysis on Searle’s work is the recognition that business rules are constructed and can be changed. The 
question business organizations must address is the context level at which the rule is defined. Organizations 
can change their internal business rules at will (e.g., granting credit or charging interest on overdue 
accounts) but they cannot change regulatory rules (e.g., customer’s credit card cannot be charged until 
goods are in shipment). Changes to regulatory rules require actions by regulatory agencies. Organizations 
can lobby such agencies, but they cannot make changes unilaterally. 
2. Identify institutional objects and authorized agents (roles) to which deontic powers are ascribed. These 
include offers, agreements, or assignments of responsibility that accrue, for example, rights, obligations, 
authorizations, and permissions required to achieve an objective within the domain of discourse. Institutional 
objects may have related concrete objects. If so, these should be identified. For example, an organization 
may require a paper copy of a sales order that includes a customer signature to authorize the transaction. 
Alternately, an institution may require an electronic document with an electronic signature to authorize the 
transaction (i.e., magnetized particles on a hard disk). Both the piece of paper with its markings and a 
section of a magnetic disk with magnetized particles on it are concrete objects. Either may be used by an 
organization to represent the institutional object sales order. 
3. Determine the nature of the deontic powers, the constitutive rules, and the agents authorized to create these 
objects and roles. Deontic powers provide the reason or authorization for taking actions that create, 
recognize, modify, or destroy an institutional object by declaration. A salesperson, for example, is an 
authorized agent having the authority to create sales orders (institutional objects). A salesperson is a person 
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(bottoms out in a brute fact). However, the role of salesperson is an institutional object type created by a 
constitutive rule within the organization. Conditions for hiring a person as a salesperson may include 
passing a background check and certain educational requirements. These are defined by the organization 
as an institution.  
4. For each institutional object, determine the agent or agents to which the deontic powers accrue. When a 
sales order is created, for example, different deontic powers may accrue to different authorized agents, both 
within and outside the organization. These may include warehouse personnel, shippers, invoicing clerks, 
customer receiving agents, and customer accounts payable agents. Each of these agents is authorized or 
obligated to take some action, the result of which is the creation of another institutional object. For example, 
warehouse personnel create a shipping document, the shipper creates a bill of lading, and so on.    
5. Determine the actions taken as a result of the attribution of deontic powers. Warehouse personnel accrue 
the authority to pick, pack, and ship the ordered goods. Doing so creates a shipment or bill of lading. The 
customer’s receiving agent must have the authority to accept delivery of goods. Doing so creates a 
confirmation of receipt of goods. Such a confirmation authorizes the invoicing clerk to create an invoice. The 
customer’s accounts payable department accrues the responsibility to pay for received goods (payment is 
conditional on receipt of goods) resulting in the creation of a check (an institutional object having the deontic 
power to transfer money from the customer’s bank account to the seller’s bank account). 
6. Produce entities (types) for each institutional object type identified. 
7. Identify the attributes that represent facts about institutional objects identified.  
Consider, for example, a customer placing an order with a vendor. The vendor’s catalog specifies the products and 
prices for available products.  These are speech acts (declarations) that constitute “offers” (institutional facts) by the 
vendor (an obligation to sell those products at those prices). The vendor accepting an order placed by a customer is 
a speech act (declaration) that results in the creation of a sales order that entails specific rights and obligations 
(what Geerts and McCarthy [2002] term commitments). The vendor is obligated to deliver goods and the customer is 
obligated to pay for the goods as specified in the deontic powers of the status function for a sales order. The sales 
order itself is a “fictitious entity” that exists only in human minds. It is typically represented in physical or electronic 
writing (paper document or computer record) to enable the management of the transaction. An information system 
plays the role of written language in documenting the existence of these institutional objects, the agents who created 
them, and the actions taken. 
The delivery of the ordered goods is an action that must be performed by the seller. The reason for the action is the 
obligation inherent in the sales order. Paying for the delivered goods is an action taken by the buyer. The reason for 
the action is the obligation inherent in the ordering and receipt of the ordered goods. However, although the 
obligation exists, people have free will to violate their obligations. Some violations are punishable by law; others are 
not. Laws are also institutional facts that have deontic powers. But people still have free will to violate them. 
Punishment by the collective (society) is a reason for not violating them. 
Recursively analyzing the sales order activity using Searle’s ontology forces questions such as, Who has the 
authority to create a sales order? What are the conditions that must be satisfied for the creation of a sales order? 
What are the deontic powers (rights, obligations, etc.) entailed by a sales order? and Who is represented to have the 
deontic powers entailed by a sales order? The answers to these questions likely involve a web of power 
relationships, some of which may need to be represented in the information system and some of which may be 
considered to be outside the scope of the information system, but all of which are part of the social ontology in which 
the business organization operates. Auditors, for example, are concerned with documenting deontic powers and 
authority relationships when opining on the adequacy of the control structure within an organization. 
Because all institutional facts are “spoken” into existence, there must be an agent who has the authority to do so. In 
the context of a sales order, there are a number of possibilities. An organization may choose, for example, to 
empower its salespeople to create sales orders. However, that power may be conditional on, for example, the buyer 
being an “authorized customer.” Authorizing a person or corporation to be a customer requires the authority to 
create the institutional fact “person or corporation (X) counts as customer (Y) in the organization (C).” That power 
may be limited, for example, to the finance department. Because the finance department is a “fictitious entity” 
created by the organization, the power to create authorized customers must “bottom out” with a person or persons 
within the finance department. Furthermore, salespeople may have conditional authority to create orders for such 
customers, for example, up to a specified dollar value. This type of power structure is common for organizations that 
sell complex, high-value products on credit; that is, to issue invoices for delivered orders.  
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Alternately, the organization may decide to empower an information system with the ability to create sales orders. 
Conditions may include pre-payment via credit card or an electronic signature verifying that the customer agrees to 
the terms of the order. This type of power structure is common for organizations that sell simple commodity products 
over the Internet. 
The deontic powers entailed by a sales order include the obligation on the part of the seller to deliver the ordered 
goods and the obligation on the part of the customer to pay for delivered goods. These are specified by the 
regulations of commerce inherent in the business context. However, organizations may specify additional deontic 
powers, including such obligations as delivery dates, FOB point, product quality, interest due if not paid within a 
specified length of time after delivery, and so on. Each represents a reason for action within the organizations 
obligated by the order—for example, pick, pack, and ship the goods in a timely manner; inspect the goods upon 
delivery; pay for delivered goods; and so on. Of course, they are also status functions accrued to people within each 
organization. For example, the obligation to deliver the goods requires actions on the part of authorized agents of 
the organization, the authorization itself being a status function. 
III. APPLYING THE META-MODEL TO SALES ORDER PROCESSING 
By collective intentionality, the government of the United States has created the institution of commerce within the 
United States for the purpose of economic prosperity and the collective benefit of its citizens. That institution defines 
regulations represented by constitutive rules by which commerce is governed. In addition, specific business 
organizations create policies and procedures for governing how the organization participates in commerce. 
Consider, for example, a distribution business: the company purchases goods from its vendors and sells them to its 
customers. For brevity we focus on the revenue cycle of the business: selling goods to customer and receiving 
payments for those goods (partially represented in Figure 2). 
A sales order is an institutional object of the type sales order having associated deontic powers: obligation of the 
seller to deliver goods (action) and the right of the seller to receive payment (action) for those goods once delivered. 
A sales order is an institutional object type. The obligation to deliver goods is imposed on institutional objects of that 
type. But how are such obligations constructed? What is it that “counts as” a sales order and imposes such deontic 
powers? As Searle (2010) suggests, all such obligations must “bottom out” in physical reality but obtain their deontic 
powers by constitutive rules.  
Within the context of a seller organization, institutional object type sales order (Y1) has deontic powers obligating the 
seller to take the action deliver ordered goods (A1). Further, a “certain piece of paper with specific printing and 
writing on it” is a concrete object (CO1) that corresponds to a completed sales order form instance institutional 
object (IO1), which belongs to institutional object type completed sales order form (IOT1). The policies and 
procedures of the company include the constitutive rule (CR1): institutional object type (IOT1) completed sales order 
form (X Type) counts as institutional object type (IOT2) sales order (Y Type) in context of the company (C1). 
As discussed above, deontic powers (D1) are imposed on institutional object type sales order (IOT2), obligating the 
seller to take the action deliver ordered goods (A1). The action deliver ordered goods (A1) requires a corresponding 
event that moves physical goods from the seller to the buyer (E1). That event changes substantial properties (e.g. 
physical location) of a set of concrete objects—that is, those physical goods (e.g., CO4, CO5, etc.) that correspond to 
institutional objects (e.g., IO4, IO5, etc.) of the institutional object type product (IOT2). Institutional object types sales 
order, invoice and product are represented by entity types (ET1, ET2, ET3) having the same descriptions as their 
corresponding institutional object types (entity types are not shown in Figure 2). Note that not all institutional object 
types need necessarily be represented as entity types. For example, it is unlikely that completed sales order form 
would be represented as an entity type; sales order would likely be sufficient. Similarly, product types would likely be 
represented using attributes of the entity product (although certainly such subtypes could be represented as entity 
types). 
The action deliver goods (A1) enables an authorized agent to create an institutional object completed invoice form 
instance (IO3) that belongs to the institutional object type completed invoice form (IOT3), which, by constitutive rule, 
counts as institutional object type invoice (IOT4), which gives the seller the right (deontic power) to receive payment 
(Action A2) from the buyer (correspondingly the buyer has the right to receive goods and the obligation to pay, 
conditioned on the receipt of goods). Of course, the institutional object completed invoice form instance (IO3) 
corresponds to a concrete object (CO3): a piece of paper on which the printing representing the particulars of the 
invoice are written (or to a sequence of bits on an electronic medium that represents that information). 
Each action must be taken by an authorized agent who is an institutional object that belongs to institutional an 
institutional object type that has the right (deontic power) to take that action (not shown in Figure 2). Ultimately each 
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authorized agent is a person. That is, institutional object types represent different roles that people play within the 
organization. A person who “counts as” a warehouse supervisor, for example, has the deontic power (authorization) 
to move physical goods (concrete objects corresponding to products) from the warehouse to a truck for delivery to a 
customer in response to an order that has been placed (and authorized by another person in the role of account 
manager).  
 
a. Mapping between concrete objects, institutional objects and institutional object types 
 
b. Mapping between deontic powers, institutional object types and constitutive rules 
 
c. Mapping between deontic powers, action and event 
Figure 2. Partial Instantiation of the Meta-Model 
 
Physical goods are concrete objects that have substantial properties such as location, size, weight, color, texture, 
chemical composition, and so on. Substantial properties can be represented by attributes that give them meaning 
(e.g., we understand the meaning of weight in terms of forces required to move an object). However, frequently 
attributes are simply ascribed to institutional object types for institutional purposes and do not correspond to 
substantial properties. Ownership, for example, is not a substantial property, but is an institutional fact, an attribute 
ascribed to concrete objects for the purpose of economic and social intercourse. That is, transferring ownership of a 
concrete object from one organization or individual to another is a declarative act that does not necessarily involve 
any substantial property of the concrete object. Although physical movement of the concrete object may accompany 
such a declaration, the transfer essentially corresponds to deontic powers: rights and obligations relative to the 
concrete object in question. And those rights and obligations are enforced by the contextual institution (e.g., 
government or regulatory agencies). The actual point at which ownership is transferred is typically specified as an 
attribute of the order. For example, FOB destination specifies that ownership is transferred when the goods reach 
their destination; FOB origin specifies that ownership is transferred when the goods are shipped. FOB point is an 
attribute without a corresponding substantial property; however, it has a significant impact on seller and buyer 
responsibilities if, for example, goods are damaged in shipping. 
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Concrete objects can be classified into kinds and natural kinds, based on commonality of substantial properties 
[Bunge, 1977, Wand and Weber, 1995]. Laws are properties that govern the substantial properties of concrete 
objects (defining, for example, what substantial properties a particular concrete object can possess). For example, 
an organization may classify concrete objects that correspond to its products (institutional object type) into those that 
are liquid and those that are solid. This may be a meaningful classification used to create an entity type in the data 
modeling sense [Chen, 1976]. However, more frequently entity types are constructed based on institutional facts and 
are represented by institutional object types. A sales order, for example, is a common entity type in an 
organizational information system. In a particular company, the policy (rule) may be that a sales order is created by 
a declarative act “completed sales order form” (X) counts as “sales order” (Y) in the context of this company (C) and, 
although the declaration “bottoms out” in “a certain piece of paper with specific printing and writing on it,” it is the fact 
that the constitutive rule exists that creates a “sales order” when a “completed sales order form” is produced. 
Further, it is the meaning communicated by the physical symbols on the paper—that is, language—that forms the 
basis for the constitutive rule and its enforcement by government. In a different company, the policy (rule) may be 
that a customer speaking the words “I place this order” and a salesperson speaking the words “I accept this order” 
are sufficient to create an instance of the institutional object type “sales order.”  
Continuing with the sales order entity type, attributes are ascribed to it, such as terms of payment, FOB point, ship-
to-address, products and quantities to be delivered, date on which the order was placed, promised delivery date, 
and so on. None corresponds to substantial properties: a sales order is an institutional object, a bundle of 
institutional facts surrounding the agreement that is a sale. Of course, because the details of a sales order are 
recorded on “a certain piece of paper with specific printing and writing on it,” it is possible to track substantial 
properties of the corresponding concrete object, such as the placement of symbols on the paper or a change in its 
location. These, may or may not be consequential in the execution of the actions taken because of the imposed 
deontic powers. 
The institutional state of an institutional object is the set of attribute values associated with the set of attributes that 
are descriptors of the entity type representing the institutional object type of that institutional object. The institutional 
state of a sales order instance, for example, is the set of values of its attributes: (terms of payment, “1% 10 Net 30”), 
(FOB point, “destination”), (ship-to-address, “401 21st Avenue South, Nashville, TN 37203”), and so on. Finally, a 
constitutive rule may have formal conditions that must be fulfilled. For example, a completed sales order form may 
be required to include values for all attributes of the corresponding sales order entity type before it can "count as" 
the X Type in the constitutive rule that creates the Y Type sales order—that is, in the constitutive rule: completing a 
sales order form (X Type) "counts as" creating an institutional object of type sales order (Y Type) in context of the 
company. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
This article has presented an examination of Searle’s social ontology as a foundation and guide for conceptual 
modeling.  There is still much work to be done both to identify relevant questions and to arrive at compelling answers 
for the development and evaluation of a useful methodology based on this ontology.  We believe, however, that the 
meta-model and the posed process represent a step in the right direction. Searle’s ontology builds on Bunge’s 
foundation of concrete objects with substantial properties, but recognizes that institutional facts and the deontic 
powers accrued to authorized agents by constitutive rules form the basis of social interactions. The contribution of 
this work is in expanding the conceptualization of information systems from a “state tracking mechanism” [Wand and 
Weber, 1990, p. 62] to an explanation of the social and power relationships that underlie social intercourse. We 
believe this is an important step in developing a theoretical foundation for conceptual modeling. Of particular 
significance is the transition from thinking about conceptual modeling as the representation of “reality” in an 
ontological sense to thinking about conceptual modeling as the representation, construction, and management of 
“deontic powers” in an epistemological sense. This transformation highlights the active role that information systems 
play in implementing organizational policies and procedures [March and Allen, 2009].  
Future research will investigate methods and techniques to identify bundles of deontic powers and institutional 
objects and how these map to brute facts as represented in Bunge’s ontology. We believe this will have significant 
impact on research in the Internet of Things (IoT), where researchers: (a) seek to understand how substantial 
properties of concrete objects and the events that change them can be interpreted to provide useful information 
[Dlodlo, Foko, Mvelase and Mathaba, 2012; Gibbs, 2013; Goncalves, 2012] and (b) seek to embed within concrete 
objects deontic powers; that is, to construct concrete objects that are “activity-aware, policy-aware and process-
aware” [Kortuem, Kawsar, Fitton and Sundramoorthy, 2010, p. 45]. Kourtuem et al. [2010], for example, describe 
smart tools that monitor construction workers’ exposure to dangerous vibrations and have embedded rules that 
enable them to alert workers if legal limits are exceeded. Clearly such tools can be empowered to shut down rather 
than merely inform. 
  
Volume 34 Article 70 
1357 
We hope that our work will facilitate a discussion of mechanisms for bringing together the physical and social 
constructions that must be managed as organizations seek to more effectively use information technology for human 
purposes. 
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